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Malicki v. Doe

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEGLIGENT HIRING
AND SUPERVISION CLAIMS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, clerical sexual abuse has been exposed
as a problem of startling proportions in the United States,
touching and impacting nearly every American diocese.'
According to one study commissioned by the American Catholic
Bishops, over the last fifty-two years four percent of priests
have been involved in sexual abuse.' In actual numbers, 4,392
priests have allegedly victimized 10,667 children over the past
five decades.' However, because these statistics only reflect
those individuals who have reported sexual abuse the numbers
may actually be much larger. As a result of the increased
awareness of sexual abuse, parishioners are suing religious
institutions in record numbers.'

© 2004 Lisa J. Kelty. All Rights Reserved.
Laurie Goodstein, Decades of Damage; Trail of Pain in Church Crisis

Leads to Nearly Every Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at Al ("Every region was
seriously affected, with 206 accused priests in the West, 246 in the South, 335 in the
Midwest and 434 in the Northeast.... The crisis reached not only big cities like Boston
and Los Angeles but smaller ones like Louisville, Ky., with 27 priests accused, and St.
Cloud, Minn., with 9.").
2

Laurie Goodstein, Two Studies Cite Child Sex Abuse by 4%
of Priests, N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at Al.
3

Id.

4 Id.

" See, e.g., id. ("[Tihe John Jay survey found that the church spent more
than $572 million on lawyers' fees, settlements and therapy for victims and treatment
for the priests. But the report said the figure was prematurely low... a more accurate
total was about three-quarters of a billion dollars...").
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Parishioners have brought these suits under various
theories, including clergy malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and several
intentional torts. However, all of these theories raise serious
constitutional problems. In civil suits against them, religious
institutions have repeatedly asserted immunity based on the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment, and have in many instances succeeded on this
defense.'

6

Many cases have upheld this constitutional defense. See, e.g., Dausch v.

Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1429 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding negligence claims of adult
parishioner barred by First Amendment as they would foster excessive state
entanglement with religion); Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp.
2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying negligent hiring, supervision, and retention
claims on grounds that by defining a duty of care owed by a member of the clergy it
would foster excessive entanglement with religion and thus is barred by the First
Amendment); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that
determining negligence claims would excessively entangle the state in the affairs of the
church and thus such determinations are barred by the Establishment Clause); Ayon v.
Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding child's claim for negligent
hiring and supervision violated First Amendment); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F.
Supp. 1138, 1150-51 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (upholding negligent supervision claim but at
the same time finding that questions of hiring and retention of clergy necessarily
required interpretation of church doctrines and thus were barred by the First
Amendment); Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 738 A.2d 839, 848 (Me.
1999); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997)
(stating that upholding the negligent supervision claim would restrict the freedom of
the church to interact with the clergy and thus was barred by the First Amendment);
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246-48 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (maintaining that
negligent hiring, ordaining, retaining, and supervision claims would result in an
endorsement of religion and inquiries into church doctrine and thus they violated the
First Amendment); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791 (Wis.
1995) (holding that "the tort of negligent hiring and retention may not be maintained
against a religious governing body due to concerns of excessive entanglement, and that
the tort of negligent training or supervision cannot be successfully asserted.., because
it would require an inquiry into church laws, practices, and policies"); S.H.C. v. ShengYen Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (finding negligent retention and
supervision claims barred by the First Amendment); Mulinix v. Mulinix, No. C2-97297, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 1102, at *18-19 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1997) (holding
that negligent supervision and retention claims were fundamentally connected to
church governance necessitating an inquiry into internal church decisions and thus
barred by the First Amendment); Heroux v. Carpentier, No. PC 92-5807, 1998 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 52, at *24-6 (R.I. Super Ct. Jan. 23, 1998); but see, e.g., Smith v.
O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding that negligent supervision claim
was not barred by First Amendment because it did not involve the interpretation of
religious doctrine); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323-24
(Colo. 1996) (holding that the First Amendment did not bar a child parishioner's claim
for negligent hiring of a minister as the claim did not involve religious doctrine); Smith
v. Privette, 495 S.E. 2d 395, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding tort claims required no
inquiry into religious doctrine and thus not barred by First Amendment); Kenneth R. v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 229 A.D.2d 159, 165, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1997) (holding negligent supervision and retention claims not barred by First
Amendment); Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E. 2d 1121, 1124-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding
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This Comment will examine the constitutionality of
negligent hiring and supervision claims brought against
religious institutions. It will focus on one case in particular,
Malicki v. Doe,7 in which the Florida Supreme Court allowed a
negligent hiring and supervision claim to proceed against St.
David Catholic Church and the Archdiocese of Miami
(collectively, the "Church Defendants").' Malicki involved the
molestation and sexual abuse of an adult and child parishioner
by a priest of the St. David Catholic Church in Miami. These
two parishioners sued the Archdiocese for negligently hiring
and supervising Father Malicki, claiming that the Archdiocese
knew or should have known of the potential dangers the priest
posed. On appeal, the court held that the First Amendment did
not bar the negligent hiring and supervision claims because
they did not involve conduct rooted in religious belief, they
applied neutral principles of tort law, and they did not
excessively entangle the state in church matters
As this Comment will show, the Malicki court's
reasoning is incorrect. Put succinctly, because claims of
negligent hiring and supervision require creating and applying
a standard of care, courts are forced to interpret religious
doctrine and perhaps prefer the practices of one religion over
another. Both of those actions violate the First Amendment.
Recognizing that, the Florida Supreme Court should never
have allowed the negligence claims to proceed against the
Church Defendants and instead should have foreclosed the
causes of action.
Part II of this Comment relays the facts of Malicki in
greater detail. Part III.A provides a general discussion of the
Supreme Court's current interpretation of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Part
III.B then explores the flaws in the Florida Supreme Court's
decision"9 and substantiates the above thesis with supporting
arguments. Part IV then switches gears to discuss the policy
reasons for preventing religious institutions from shirking all
responsibility for their inadequate actions to protect their
that negligent supervision claims may not implicate church doctrine and thus did not
violate the First Amendment).
7 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) [hereinafter
Malicki].
8

Id.

9 Id.

10 These flaws include the Court's misinterpretation of the First Amendment
and its inconsistency with previous rulings. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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parishioners. In light of the pervasive need for society to
protect individuals, especially children, from sexual abuse, Part
IV goes on to propose several possible claims that would more
legitimately survive First Amendment scrutiny, including
intentional torts and criminal charges. Finally, this Comment
concludes that negligence claims involving the ordination and
supervision of a cleric should be barred as unconstitutional but
that several alternative claims that do not involve the
interpretation of religious scripture by secular courts can pass
constitutional muster.

II. THE FACTS OF MALICKI
In Malicki, a minor and an adult parishioner who
worked at St. David Catholic Church sued the church and the
Archdiocese of Miami for negligently hiring, supervising, and
retaining Father Jan Malicki." The minor and adult
parishioner worked at the church in exchange for tuition and
worked under the direct supervision and control of Father
Malicki and the Church Defendants."
In the complaint, the respondents alleged "that on
numerous occasions, [Father] Malicki 'fondled, molested,
touched, abused, sexually assaulted and/or battered' the
3
parishioners on the premises of St. David." The negligent
hiring and supervision claims were premised on the accusation
that the "Church Defendants 'knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known, [that Father Malickil was
unsuited for teaching, counseling, spiritually guiding,
supervising and leading employees and parishioners."' The
parishioners also claimed that "the Church Defendants
negligently failed 'to make inquiries into [Father] Malicki's
background, qualifications, reputation, work history, and/or
criminal history prior to employing him in the capacity of
Associate Pastor.'"" Lastly, the parishioners asserted that "the
Church Defendants negligently placed them under the
supervision of Father Malicki, when the Church Defendants

" Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 352.
12 id.
13 id.
14

Id.

15 Id.
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either knew or should have known that Father Malicki had the
'
propensity to commit sexual assaults and molestations. ""
The Church Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that "resolution of these issues would 'involve
the internal ecclesiastical decisions of the Roman Catholic
Church required by Canon Law' and therefore they [were]
barred by the First Amendment."'" The trial court agreed with
the Church Defendants and dismissed the case."
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court.'9 The Third District claimed that
the real issue was whether the Church Defendants had reason
to know of Father Malicki's misconduct and did nothing to
prevent it. Furthermore, the appellate court stated that since
this issue did not require an inquiry into the religious doctrines
and practices of the church, the First Amendment did not bar
its resolution."
The Church Defendants appealed the Third District's
decision to the Florida Supreme Court, which affirmed."' It
reasoned that the case did not implicate the Free Exercise
Clause because "the conduct sought to be regulated; that is, the
Church Defendants' alleged negligence in hiring and
supervise[ing] [was] not rooted in religious belief."22 The court
further stated, even "assuming an 'incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice,' the parishioners'
cause of action ... [was] not barred because it [was] based on
[a] neutral application of principles of tort law."' The court
additionally refused to bar the case on the basis of the
Establishment Clause, stating:
The Establishment clause does not bar these causes of action
because the imposition of tort liability in this case has a secular
purpose and the primary effect of imposing tort liability based on
allegations of the complaint neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The core inquiry in determining whether the Church Defendants are
liable will focus on whether they reasonably should have foreseen
the risk of harm to third parties. This is a neutral principle of tort
law. Therefore, based on the allegations in the complaint, we do not
16 Malicki, 814

So. 2d at 352.
Id at 353.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Malicki, 814 So. 2d
at 365.
22 Id.
at 361.
23 Id.
17
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foresee 'excessive' entanglement in internal church matters or in
2
interpretation of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law. '

With that background set, this Comment next examines the
relevant First Amendment principles before applying them to
the case at hand.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

FirstAmendment

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
" Through the
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses, the First
Amendment stands for the notion that church and state should
remain separate; however, it does not require that the
separation be total." There are many instances in which the
government and the courts may restrict conduct that might be
For example, in
characterized as religious practice."
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court upheld a law
prohibiting the use of peyote during religious ceremonies.'
However, the Constitution conditions any such involvement
upon courts applying neutral principles of law," avoiding
excessive entanglement between church and state," and

Id. at 364.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the First
Amendment applicable to the states. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290, 301 (2000); Capital Square Review & Advisory Ed. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757
(1995).
26 Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, Supreme Court Cases Involving
Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of Federal Constitution, 37 L. Ed. 2d
1147, 1158 (1999).
27 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding an
Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote during religious ceremonies as constitutional
since the free exercise clause was not implicated because the law was not aimed at
promoting or restricting religious beliefs).
24

2

28 Id.

id. at 878 (holding "the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes)'") (citation omitted).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (creating a three-prong
3
test to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated, including a
prong that governmental action must not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion") (citation omitted).
29 See

20041
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doctrine, polity, or

1. The Establishment Clause
The first clause of the First Amendment, the
Establishment Clause, guards against three main evils:
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the
sovereign in religious activity."" The main inquiry under the
Establishment Clause was set down in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 In
Lemon, the Court stated that a governmental action is valid
under the Establishment Clause if it has a secular purpose, if
its primary effect is neither to enhance nor inhibit religion, and
if the action does not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion." The Court stressed that total
separation of church and state is not possible and thus only
excessive intrusions by the government into religion would be
held unconstitutional. 5 Under the third prong of the above test,
to determine whether the entanglement is excessive a court
must "examine the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the state provides,
and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority."" Throughout the 1990s, the Supreme
Court did not consistently apply this three-part test." The
Court more often turned to the concept of religious neutrality
to guide its decisions." However, the Lemon test has never been
overruled and is still the predominate doctrine."
3, Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d
239, 246 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (citing
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969), and Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979)).
32 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,
668(1970)).
33 Id. at
602.
34 Id. at 612-13.
35 Id. at
614.
36 Id. at
615.
37 L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d
434, 440 n.11 (Wis. 1997).
38 Id. Laws that have a valid secular objective
are not invalid merely because
they confer an indirect, remote, or incidental benefit upon religious institutions. Comm.
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973). The Supreme
Court has concluded "that under the Establishment Clause the proper relationship of
government vis-a-vis religion and religious institutions in this country is not one of
hostility, but neutrality, and that the neutrality which is required need not stem from
callous indifference to religion, but may at times be benevolent." Kramer, supra note
26.
39 Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454
n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1996)
(citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)).
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For purposes of this Comment the most relevant part of
the Lemon test is the nonentanglement requirement. In
interpreting the phrase "excessive government entanglement,"
the Supreme Court has concluded that "routine regulatory
interaction which involves no inquir[y] into religious doctrine,
no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no
'detailed monitoring and close administrative contact' between
secular and religious bodies, [will] not itself violate the
nonentanglement command."" By implication, if the inverse of
any of the preceding three statements are true - e.g., if the
regulation necessitates an examination of religious doctrine or
results in a close surveillance of religious institutions excessive entanglement between church and state may result.
In Hernandez v. Commissioner, the Court was faced
with just such an entanglement problem.' Hernandez involved
a dispute between a group of Scientologist followers and the
42
Internal Revenue Service over a tax deduction. Scientologists
believe that inside of every human being is an immortal spirit
and the only way to become aware of this spiritual dimension is
3
to go through a process known as "auditing."" "Auditing
involves a one-to-one encounter between a participant ... and
a Church official . . . " to help the participant reach spiritual
enlightenment." Pursuant to this belief the Church offered
several different types of classes to its parishioners allowing
them to increase their spiritual awareness and train to be
auditors by studying the tenets of the faith." The payments
received for these classes were based on a central tenet of the
"
Scientologist faith known as the 'doctrine of exchange and
they formed the Church's primary source of income. Each of
the petitioners made payments for these training and auditing
services and tried to deduct such payments under Section 170
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as a charitable
See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989) (emphasis added)
(citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969), and Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), and
quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.
Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 395-96 (1990).
490 U.S. 680 (1989).
40

42 Id. at 684.
43

id.

4

Id.

" Id. at 680.

According to this doctrine "any time a person receives something he must
pay something back." 490 U.S. at 685.
41 Id. at 685-86.
46

2004]
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contribution. 4' Petitioners argued that by denying the deduction
the Court would violate the Establishment Clause because it
would require the "IRS to entangle itself with religion by
engaging in 'supervision of religious beliefs and practices' and
'valuation of religious services. ' ""
The Court held that there was no Establishment Clause
violation because Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code
comported with all three prongs of the Lemon test.' With
regard to the excessive entanglement prong, among other
things, the Court stated that there was no violation of the
Establishment Clause because Section 170 did not require the
"[giovernment to distinguish between 'secular' and 'religious'
benefits or services" in that all the IRS had to do to determine
if the payment was outside the Section 170 deduction was to
gather information necessary to determine if it was part of a
quid pro quo transaction." The Court noted that it is only the
petitioners' interpretation of Section 170" that would require
the government to make such distinctions." The Court also
pointed out that the application of Section 170 did not place a
monetary value on religious benefits because the petitioners
had claimed that the entire amount of their payments was
exempt, rather than that a certain portion was exempt because
it exceeded the value of the religious service.' Based on these
two findings, there was no entanglement giving rise to an
Establishment Clause violation.55 In other words, because the
Court was not forced to delve into religious doctrine to decide
any of the issues, the Establishment Clause was not violated.
Similarly, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether a state could tax the distribution of religious
materials by a religious organization without implicating the
First Amendment.' The Court found that the taxation did not
48 Id. at 686.
'9
50

Id. at 695.

Id. at 696.

490 U.S. at 697.
The petitioners' interpretation was that "a quid
pro quo analysis is
inappropriate under §170 when the benefit a taxpayer receives is purely religious in
nature . . . [and alternatively] . . . payments made for the right to participate in a
religious service should be automatically deductible under § 170." Id. at 692.
51
52

53
4

Id. at 697.
Id.

55 Id. at 696.

493 U.S. 378, 380 (1990).
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involve an excessive government entanglement with religion
7
and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court
rested its holding most significantly on the fact that "the
imposition of the sales and use tax without an exemption for
appellant [did] not require the State to inquire into the
religious content of the items sold or the religious motivation
for selling or purchasing the items . . ."' However, again, had
the practice required the interpretation of religious practices or
policies, the Court may have come to very different conclusions.
Finally, many lower courts have interpreted the
excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test to mean that
"[e]xcessive entanglement occurs when the courts begin to
review and interpret a church's constitution, laws, and
regulations .""'
2. The Free Exercise Clause
In contrast to the Establishment Clause, the Free
Exercise Clause "guarantees 'first and foremost, the right 'to
'
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.
Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause protects against laws that
discriminate based on religious beliefs, as well as ordinances
that regulate or prohibit conduct undertaken for religious
reasons." However, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the
Free Exercise Clause as an absolute protection of religious
freedom. 2 In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court stated that
although the clause protects an individual's freedom to believe
and freedom to act, the freedom to act is not absolute, since
regulations on conduct are necessary to ensure an orderly and
safe society.' For instance, in Cantwell the Court alluded to the
fact that although the state may not deny the right to preach or
disseminate religious views, it may regulate the time, place,
and manner of such events.' However, regulation and
5'

Id. at 397.
Id. at 396 (emphasis added).

5' See, e.g., Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

0 Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 354 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)).
61 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993).

62 Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual

Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 45, 69 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 304.
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infringement are not synonymous, and any attempt to infringe
on the free exercise of religion, beyond mere regulations to keep
peace and order in society, must be justified by a compelling
state interest.'
The first inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause is
whether the conduct being regulated "is rooted in religious
belief."" If the conduct is rooted in religious belief, then the
court must decide whether the law or governmental conduct
regulating the religious belief is neutral "both on its face and in
its purpose."" The Supreme Court has held that if a law's
primary purpose is to infringe upon or restrict practices due to
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is valid
only if justified by a compelling interest narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.' However, if a neutral law of general
applicability69 only incidentally burdens religious practices, it
need not be justified by a compelling interest."°
3. Religious Autonomy Doctrine
Finally, under the umbrella of both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has
developed a concept referred to as the religious autonomy
doctrine, which bars secular courts from becoming too closely
Kramer, supra note 26.
Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 354 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
67 Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993). In Lukumi, the Court discussed the process of determining if a law is facially
and objectively neutral. To determine facial neutrality a person must look at the text of
the statute. If the law refers to a religious practice without obvious secular meaning it
is facially neutral. In Lukumi, the Court held that even though the law contained
religious terms such as sacrifice and ritual, it was not obviously facially discriminatory
because these terms had religious as well as secular meaning. However, the Court
stated facial neutrality was not the end of the inquiry. A law must also be neutral in its
object or purpose. Here, it was clear that the object of the law was the suppression of
the central element of the Santeria worship service and thus the law was not neutral in
its purpose. Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 533. The compelling interest test involves a very difficult burden. For
example, in Lukumi the court dealt with laws prohibiting animal sacrifice. The Court
found the ordinances were not neutral as they aimed to proscribe the religious
practices of Santeria adherents. Furthermore, although protecting public health and
preventing cruelty to animals may be compelling state interests, the laws were both
under-inclusive and over-inclusive and thus did not meet the burdens of the test. Id. at
542-45. In its summation, the Court stated, "A law that targets religious conduct...
will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases." Id. at 546.
69 For examples of neutral
laws of general applicability, see discussion
infra
Part III.B.2.a.
70 Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S.
at 531. In such a case, no further inquiry
is
required.
65
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involved in the internal affairs of religious institutions." Under
this doctrine, the First Amendment prohibits courts from
resolving doctrinal disputes or determining whether a religious
72
organization acted in accordance with its canons and bylaws.
In short, courts may not adjudicate a claim when rendering a
decision would require interpreting religious doctrine." Instead,
"where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without
extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and
polity, . . . civil courts shall not disturb the decision of the
[hierarchical church], but must accept such decisions as
binding on them .... .""
This doctrine was fashioned in Watson v. Jones, which
held that civil courts should steer clear of questions regarding
religious discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law." It
took further hold in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church." Presbyterian
involved a property dispute between two local churches that
arose following their withdrawal from a larger hierarchical
general church organization." Under the applicable law, the
" See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Malivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)
[hereinafter Serbian]; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S.
94 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1872). The Court has spoken of the religious
autonomy doctrine in reference to both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
and it may in fact implicate both clauses.
72 Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D.R.I. 1997). "This prohibition
derives from cases arising out of disputes between parties within a church in which an
in
interpretation of ecclesiastical law or church doctrine is required." Id. For example,
by
Bishop
Orthodox
a
Serbian
of
removal
the
Serbian, the Court refused to invalidate
an ecclesiastical court holding that:
[Clivil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judiciaries of a
religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. For civil courts to
analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that
sense 'arbitrary' must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that
canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to
follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to
decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the
First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would
undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper
subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the
ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.
426 U.S. at 713.
73 Smith, 986 F. Supp. at 77 (citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
74 Serbian, 426 U.S. at 709.
75 Id. at 710, (citing Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 727 (1872)).
76 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
77 Id.

at 441.
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right to the property turned on "whether the general church
abandoned or departed from the tenets of faith and practice it
held at the time the local churches affiliated with it."78
Accordingly, resolving the property dispute would turn on
whether the actions of the general church strayed substantially
from prior doctrine."' The Court held that the First Amendment
prohibited such a determination since it would require the
interpretation of church doctrines.' Finally, the doctrine came
to fruition in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Malivojevich.
In Serbian, the Court held the First Amendment prevented a
court from deciding whether a hierarchical church's decision to
remove a bishop was arbitrary and improper, as that decision
would "necessitate[] the interpretation of ambiguous religious
law and usage."8 ' Therefore, it is clear that if a claim
necessitates the interpretation of religious scripture, then
under the First Amendment, it is not adjudicable in civil court.
B.

Analysis of the FloridaSupreme Court Decision

In Malicki, the Florida Supreme Court held that
imposing liability on the Church Defendants for negligently
hiring and supervising its clergy 2 would not violate the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.'
First, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the negligent
hiring and supervision claims do not implicate the Free
Exercise Clause because the hiring and supervision of clergy is
not rooted in religious belief, and even if it were, the causes of
action for negligent hiring and supervision apply neutral
principles of tort law.'
Second, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the
causes of action did not offend the tenets of the Establishment
Clause because the core inquiry, whether the Church
Defendants reasonably should have foreseen the risk of harm
to third parties, did not require an interpretation of religious

78

Id.

79 Id. at 450.

soId.
Serbian, 426 U.S. 696, 708 (1976).
82 For lack of a more comprehensive
term, the terms "clergy" and "cleric" will
refer to all religions generally, rather than Christianity specifically.
Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002).
84 Id. at
361.
81
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doctrine or ecclesiastical law.' Ultimately, the following
analysis will show that the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning
contravenes First Amendment doctrine.
1. Negligent Hiring
Due to contradictory Supreme Court precedent in the
religious autonomy line of cases, the Florida Supreme Court
was wrong in upholding the constitutionality of the negligent
hiring claim.' The Supreme Court, in cases such as Kedroff v.
87
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church and
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, has
repeatedly made clear that the Free Exercise Clause bars
secular courts from passing upon matters of clergy selection. In
Kedroff, the Supreme Court invalidated on free exercise
grounds a New York State law that undertook to transfer the
control of the New York Russian Orthodox churches from one
group to another.' The Court explained that its prior opinions
radiate[d] . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organization, an
independence from secular control or manipulation - in short, power
to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to
select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we
think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as
a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.90

In other words, the Court held that religious institutions
should be free to select and appoint their members without
undue interference by civil courts.
The Court came to a similar holding in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich." In Serbian, petitioners had
suspended and removed a bishop from their church due to
Id. at 364.
To establish negligent hiring, the plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(i) the employer was required to make an investigation of the employee and
failed to do so, (ii) an appropriate investigation would have revealed the
unsuitability of the employee for the particular duty to be performed or for
employment in general, and (iii) it was unreasonable for the employer to hire
the employee in light of the information the employer knew or should have
known.
Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 362 (2002).
87 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
TM 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
89 344 U.S. 94 (1952).

90Id. at 116. (emphasis added) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)).
91 426 U.S. 696.
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complaints about his fitness as a bishop and his administration
of the Diocese.' The bishop sued for reinstatement. The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the proceedings of dismissal
were "procedurally and substantively defective" and thus the
removal was "arbitrary and invalid."' The Court reversed this
decision by finding, like in Kedroff, that the "ordination of a
priest is a 'quintessentially religious' matter, 'whose resolution
the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest
5
ecclesiastical tribunals of [the] hierarchical church."M
Following these two cases it is clear that it was, and is, the
Supreme Court's intention to, as far as practical, yield to the
selection and hiring decisions of religious institutions.
However, as evidenced by the language in Kedroff, the
freedom to select the clergy is not absolute. Only to the extent
that "no improper method of choice are proven," will the
decisions of a religious organization be accepted without
question.' Although this broadly worded exception might
appear to fit Malicki, the Supreme Court has qualified this
language considerably. 7 In Kedroff, the Court quoted Gonzalez
v. Archbishop as stating in dicta that '"[i]n the absence of fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church
tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting
civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts
as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by
contract or otherwise.'"" In effect, the Court seemed to indicate
that the only time a decision would be found improper is if
there existed fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness in its
formulation. In Serbian, the Supreme Court limited this
exception further by rejecting its arbitrariness component on
the ground that judging whether a decision is arbitrary would
entail a constitutionally impermissible inquiry into religious
doctrine and procedures."
92

Id. at 702-03.

3 Id. at 707.

Id. at 698.
95 Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo.
1997) (en banc) (quoting

Serbian,426 U.S. at 720) (emphasis added).
Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
97 Id. at 116 n.23; Serbian, 426 U.S. 696 (1991).
The Court had to qualify this
language because otherwise the exception would swallow the rule. Anytime the court
decided a hiring decision of the church was "improper," it could overrule it.
98 344 U.S. at
116 n.23.
99 Serbian, 426 U.S. at 713-14. The Court did not reach the
issues of fraud or
collusion because they were not involved in the case.
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Thus, the ultimate question is whether the facts of
Malicki fall within the fraud/collusion exception to the normal
rule that neither secular courts nor states should become
involved in the clergy selection process of religious groups. The
answer is unquestionably no. The plaintiffs did not allege that
Malicki was fraudulently selected or that his hiring was the
product of collusion. The claim was instead that the Church
Defendants "failed 'to make inquires into Malicki's background,
qualifications, reputation, work history, and/or criminal history
"
prior to employing him in the capacity of Associate Pastor. "
As such, the Florida Supreme Court overstepped its authority
in allowing the negligent hiring claim to stand since it involves
an assessment of whether the priest in question was properly
selected. Just as the Supreme Court in Serbian held that the
court had no right to determine if dismissal of a clergy member
was proper, the court here had no right to pass judgment on
whether the hiring of a clergy member was proper.
Some may argue that the case at hand is
distinguishable from these previous ordination cases because
these prior cases asked whether the priest was properly
retained as a priest under the relevant religious doctrine, while
Malicki simply concerns a question of whether Father Malicki
was properly selected vis-a-vis a secular duty to avoid
foreseeable harm to others. In other words, the court here is
not seeking to de-ordain; it is simply imposing liability based
on a question of whether the church should have foreseen the
harm. However, I would disagree with this argument. This case
fits precisely within the above line of cases. As will be
discussed in greater detail below in relation to the negligent
supervision claim, a reasonableness inquiry involves more than
just a question of whether the defendant should have foreseen
the harm. The more important question, and the question that
creates the First Amendment problem, is: Were the actions
'
taken in response to the foreseeable harm reasonable?" Here,
the action taken in response to the foreseeable harm would
have been the hiring of the priest. Therefore, the court will
have to pass judgment on whether it was reasonable and
proper for the church to hire the priest. In making such a
reasonableness judgment the court must take into
consideration the religious doctrines relevant in the ordination
'0 Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 352 (Fla. 2002).
'o' See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.
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of a priest.' Thus, when one looks closely at the elements of
this negligent hiring claim, it is apparent that the court will be
passing judgment on whether the priest was properly hired as
a priest under the relevant religious doctrines. Such a judgment
will result in the secular courts setting the standards for
church hiring in the future. This is what the above line of cases
has attempted to guard against.
2.

Negligent Supervision

The Florida Supreme Court was equally wrong to say
that the negligent supervision claim was constitutional;
however, the reasoning is slightly more complicated than the
negligent hiring claim. Upholding the supervision claim deeply
interjects secular courts into the internal functioning of
religious organizations and transgresses both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses. It also contradicts the religious
autonomy doctrine described above.
a. The Court's Improper Treatment
of the Free Exercise Clause
The court's reasoning regarding the Free Exercise
Clause was improper on several accounts. First, the court
incorrectly asserted that the supervision of clergy is not rooted
in religious belief and thus does not implicate the Free Exercise
Clause. In actuality, the religious doctrine of each
denomination forms the very basis for supervision policies.' °3
Second, the court inaccurately stated that the cause of action
for negligent supervision applies neutral principles of tort law
and therefore does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. In fact
this tort is not analogous to the regulations the Supreme Court
has found to be neutral laws of general applicability, as its
application will infringe on the religious beliefs used to
formulate the supervisory policy of the particular religious
institution.
The Florida Supreme Court's assertion that the
supervision of clergy is not rooted in religious belief was wrong.
102

See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.

1o' See James T. O'Reilly & JoAnn Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct:
Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 31, 46 (1994); see also LYNN R. BUZZARD & THOMAS S. BRANDON, JR.,
CHURCH DISCIPLINE AND THE COURTS (1987).
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The Roman Catholic Church and other religious institutions
have well-established disciplinary policies and rules for their
clergy." Religious norms imbue these policies, such as mercy
and forgiveness of sin, and it is these beliefs that govern the
conduct of the particular religious institution."'0 For example,
M

[iun the Roman Catholic Church... [clanon law preserves the rights
of the accused, and prevents dismissal of a priest by a bishop, even
for the grave offense of child sexual abuse, if the conduct occurred as
a result of psychological or physical impairment of the individual
priest. Though dismissal for clergy sexual abuse has been made
more likely as a result of canon law changes, it is still a cumbersome
up in a traditional deference to the
internal discipline issue bound
06
sacred status of the priest.

What is most significant to this discussion is that these
policies and norms are not randomly developed by the church
upon a majority vote but are in fact derived from basic themes
of the Old and New Testaments such as confession, repentance,
the kingdom, diakonia, and koinonia, as well as from specific
scripture.' ' The key passage for church discipline is Matthew
18:15-18, which reads:
[Ihf thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault
between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained
thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or
two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, let him be
unto thee as a heathen man and a publican. I say unto you,
Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and
whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.'

This passage has been interpreted as meaning there
should never be indifference to sin but rather a full and
concerted effort to recover the individual who has gone
astray." Only in the event the member consistently rejects
recovery should they be cast out by the community." Matthew
18 contains other verses to reinforce this interpretation. For
example:

o4 O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 103, at 46.

at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
'07 BUZZARD & BRANDON, supra note 103, at 39.
"'"

"'s

Id.

108 id.

"' Id. at 39-40.
"o Id. at 40.
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God seeks the one lost sheep and rejoices when it is found (vv. 12,
13), the Father is unwilling that any of the little ones be lost (v. 14),
his forgiveness reaches seventy times seven (v. 22), and we have a
duty to forgive as we have been forgiven lest judgment fall upon us
(vv. 23-35).'"

Many Christian sects have looked to Matthew 18 as
guidance for their disciplinary policies, including Calvinists,
Anabaptists, and Baptists. 2 The Baptists, for example, read
Matthew 18 to mean that only a failure to hear the church will
result in exclusion. "It [is] not the sin, but the refusal to repent
and be reconciled that occasion[s] the church's severe[st]
13
action."
Thus, the discipline of priests is not an arbitrary
decision made by individual religious leaders, but is in fact
governed by deep-seated religious beliefs, norms, and practices.
Accordingly, permitting a secular court or jury to determine
whether a religious institution has sufficiently disciplined,
sanctioned, or counseled a clergy member would involve
sensitive judgments about the propriety of religious beliefs and
implicate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."'
For instance, in this case, depending on what scripture the
Church Defendants use to justify their actions, to come to a full
and complete decision regarding the negligent supervision
claim the court must also pass judgment on whether acting in
conformity with such scriptural beliefs was negligent,
inadvertently passing judgment on the appropriateness of the
relevant scripture. It is this secondary judgment that is
violative of the Free Exercise Clause.
The Florida Supreme Court's second argument
regarding the Free Exercise Clause is also unsound. The Court
stated that the cause of action for negligent supervision applies
neutral principles of tort law and therefore does not violate the
Free Exercise Clause even if it has an incidental effect on
religious beliefs."5 However, a negligent supervision claim
cannot be equated with the neutral laws of general
applicability expounded in Employment Division v. Smith."'
"'l

Id.

1

BUZZARD & BRANDON, supra note 103, at 50-51, 55.

1"3 Id. at 56.

114 Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society of N.Y., 738 A.2d 839, 848
(Me. 1999); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1249 (D. Colo. 1998).
115Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 361 (Fla. 2002).
116 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
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In Employment Division, the Court stated "the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."'' 7 The Court then
proceeded to list a number of generally applicable laws that the
Court has upheld despite their impact on religion, including
child labor laws,"' Sunday-closing laws,"' and Selective Service
120

Although the Court in Employment Division gave
examples of neutral laws of general applicability, it was not
until Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that the Court
expressly defined these terms.2 M Lukumi dealt with the
constitutionality of a series of ordinances that prohibited

117
118

Id.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the Court held

valid a Massachusetts statute which barred any boy under twelve or girl under
eighteen from selling "any newspapers, magazines, [or] periodicals ... in any street or
public place," and imposed a penalty upon any parent, guardian or custodian who
permitted a minor under his or her control to work in violation of the law. Id. at 16061. The Court as well upheld the conviction of a Jehovah Witness who allowed her
daughter to sell religious magazines on the street in direct contradiction of the law. Id.
at 168-70. The Court rejected the argument that the law denied the defendant's right
to freedom of religion claiming that the state had a right to protect children against the
dangers of preaching religion on a highway. Id.
'19 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, appellants,
Orthodox Jewish merchants engaged in the retail sale of clothing and home
furnishings, challenged the constitutional validity of a Pennsylvania criminal statute
which proscribed the Sunday retail sale of several commodities including clothing and
furniture. Id. at 600-01. The appellants claimed the Sunday closing law respected an
establishment of religion and abridged their free exercise rights as they would have to
keep their stores open on Saturday, their Sabbath, in order to counteract the economic
loss which would be incurred from closing on Sundays. Id. at 601-02. The Court upheld
the statute as it only had an incidental effect on religion (the inconveniencing of those
members of the Jewish faith who chose to work on Sundays) and it did not illegalize
any religious practice of the appellants, but rather simply regulated secular activity.
Id. at 605-06.
120 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In Gillette, the petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of Section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of
1967 which provided that no person shall be subject to "service in the armed forces of
the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form." Id. at 441. The petitioners, who objected
specifically to the Vietnam War, claimed that the law violated their Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause rights as it was construed to apply only to objectors of all war
and not to objectors of a specific war even if that objection was religious in nature. Id.
at 448. The Court held that Section 6(j) did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment as it did not discriminate based on religious affiliation or belief, nor
did it violate the Free Exercise clause as it was not designed to interfere with any
particular religious practice or penalize any theological position. Id. at 450-53, 461-62.
121 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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animal sacrifice. 2 These were passed specifically as a means of
denying licenses to the Santeria Church for its practices of
animal sacrifice. 2' In Lukumi, the Court stated that neutrality
and general applicability are interrelated and the presence of
one implies the presence of the other.'24 In defining neutrality,
the Court stated: "[hIf the object of a law is to infringe upon or
restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law
is not neutral." 12' The Court further stated that the inquiry into
neutrality can go beyond the face of a law to its effects.' 21 "The
[Free Exercise] Clause forbids 'subtle departures from
neutrality' and 'covert suppression of particular religious
beliefs.".22 The Court then went on to state that although it was
not necessary in Lukumi to define the exact standard used to
evaluate whether a prohibition is generally applicable, the
principle behind it is that the "government, in the pursuit of
legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief .... In
the end, the court found the ordinances were not neutral in text
or effect as the law disproportionately impacted the ritual of
Santeria sacrifice. 12' Furthermore, they were not of general
applicability as they were targeted at religious belief and failed
to prohibit similar non-religious behavior."'
Under the Lukumi test the negligent supervision claim
here would not be neutral in its effect despite the fact that it
seems to be neutral on its face. The court in Lukumi stresses
that a law may be found not neutral if it covertly suppresses
particular religious beliefs. As discussed above, a religion's
supervisory and disciplinary policies are derived from religious
scripture and are imbued with religious norms such as
"penance, admonition and reconciliation as a sacramental
response for sin."'' If a court finds that actions taken in
reliance on such beliefs are negligent, it will result in a
rejection of those particular beliefs. Furthermore, since each
denomination holds its own distinct set of beliefs, this tort will
'

12
123

Id. at 524.
Id.

Id. at 531.
Id. at 533.
126 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
127 Id. at 534.
128 Id. at 543.
'29 Id. at 535-42.
130Id. at 543-44.
124
125

"' O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 103, at 47.
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disproportionately impact some religions more than others,
depending on which actions the court deems negligent. This
effective illegalization of the particular beliefs of certain
religions is not neutral, and the tort infringes on the free
exercise rights of the religion in question. "To demand that
church elders and pastors exercise church discipline in keeping
with their religious faith and practices only at the risk of
catastrophic liability in civil suits utilizing the machinery of
the state certainly is a burden on the [free] exercise of
religion."13
Despite the above free exercise arguments, the
supervision claim can be upheld upon a showing of a
compelling state interest narrowly tailored to advance that
interest." This is a very difficult burden to meet; if the tort is
in any way over- or under-inclusive it will be rejected." And in
any event, the claim still faces the Establishment Clause and
religious autonomy problems that will be discussed below.
b. The Florida Court's Misguided Interpretation
of the Establishment Clause
The Florida Supreme Court's reasoning regarding the
Establishment Clause is also misguided. The court's contention
that the central determination under the negligence claims whether the Church Defendants reasonably should have
foreseen the risk of harm to third parties - did not require an
inquiry into church doctrines is erroneous. In order to
accurately decide the negligence claims in Malicki, the court
would have to make certain reasonableness determinations,
which would in turn require the creation of a standard of care
and the interpretation of religious doctrine. These activities
excessively entangle secular courts in church matters and
result in a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The Florida Supreme Court misses half the analysis.
Contrary to the court's claim, the necessary inquiry in
determining claims of negligent supervision is not merely
whether the Church Defendants should have foreseen the

132 See BUZZARD & BRANDON, supra note 103, at 223.
'3

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533

134

Id.

(1993).
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potential danger,'35 but also whether, given the level of
forseeability, their conduct under the circumstances was
reasonable;" 6 in other words, whether their actions in
supervising Father Malicki and placing him close proximity to
37
parishioners breached some standard of reasonable care.'
Therefore, there are two parts to the negligence analysis: (1)
Whether the harm was foreseeable (a question that the Florida
Supreme Court recognizes); and (2) Whether the actions of the
Church Defendants in response to the foreseeable harm were
reasonable. It is the second part of this inquiry that proves
problematic under the First Amendment, and it this issue that
the Florida Supreme Court ignores.
The reasonableness inquiry under the second part of
this negligence analysis would require the court to determine if
the Church Defendants acted as other reasonable church
defendants would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances." Normally, the relevant question would be
whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man
would have acted in the same or similar situation, a fairly
objective standard. However, in certain cases, where the
defendant is engaged in a highly specialized job for which
ordinary people do not have the training or experience to pass
135

Although foreseeability remains part of the inquiry, it is not the end of the

inquiry. If the danger was not foreseeable it is obvious that the defendants could not
have been negligent since a person cannot be liable for unforeseeable dangers he could
not avoid. However, if the dangers were foreseeable, the question becomes, considering
the defendants knowledge level, whether it was reasonable for the defendant to place
the clergy member in close proximity to parishioners. It is this last inquiry that the
Florida Supreme Court ignores. However, it is this inquiry that poses the
constitutional problem.
136 See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249-50 (Mo.
1997) (en banc)
("Whether negligence exists in a particular situation depends on whether or not a
reasonably prudent person would have anticipated danger and provided against it. In
order to determine how a 'reasonably prudent Diocese' would act, a court would have to
excessively entangle itself in religious doctrine, policy, and administration.") (emphasis
added). See also Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250-51 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding
negligent supervision claim unconstitutional as it would necessitate an examination of
whether the procedures the Archdiocese Defendants had in place regarding supervision
were "reasonable and adequate").
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 213 (1958) ("A person conducting an activity through servants or other
agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or
reckless... in the supervision of the activity.").
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (stating
unless the actor is
a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is
that of a reasonable man under like circumstances). This is partially a subjective
standard because it requires examining the reasonableness of the conduct in the
context of what a person in like circumstances would have done.
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judgment, the court will apply a reasonable professional
standard.39' In such instances, the defendant's actions will be
compared to what another person in that profession would
have done. 4 ° For instance, when a court litigates an attorney
malpractice or medical malpractice case, the court looks at
what a reasonable professional in that trade would have done
under like circumstances, not what a reasonable man would
have done.1 4 ' Given the complexity of religious scripture, of
which a vast portion of the population has little to no
understanding, clerics should likewise be judged under a
professional standard of care. To do otherwise would be unfair
to the cleric who is conforming his or her actions to the
standards of his or her profession. This is where the
constitutional problem of excessive entanglement arises.
In creating this professional standard of care and
determining whether a church defendant acted reasonably in
supervising its clerics, the court would have to come up with a
"reasonable cleric" standard for each religion, such as a
reasonable bishop standard, a reasonable rabbi standard, and a
reasonable priest standard. 2 Such individualized standards
would be required because as explained above, the traditional
denominations each have their own intricate principles of
governance, supervision, and discipline that must be taken into
consideration in formulating the reasonable professional
standard. Furthermore, because these disciplinary principles
are infused with the religious tenets of the particular sect at
issue the court will be forced to delve into and interpret
religious doctrine in order to adequately understand the
governance policies of the sect and pass judgment on whether
they were reasonable. "3 It is this interpretation of religious
scripture that would result in an excessive entanglement of
church and state.

139

The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589 (1905) (holding the reasonable prudent person

takes on the profession of the actor and an objective standard is applied).
140 Id. at 596.
1
See, e.g., Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1954); see also Boyce v.
Brown, 77 P.2d 455 (Ariz. 1938).
142 See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 103, at 47; see also Schmidt v. Joseph
P. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding "[any effort by this Court to
instruct the trial jury as to the duty of care which a clergyman should exercise, would
of necessity require the Court or jury to define and express the standard of care to be
followed by other reasonable Presbyterian clergy of the community").
143 See, e.g., S.H.C. v. Sheng-Yen Lu, 54 P.3d 174, 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002);
see also, L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 442 (Wis. 1997).
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The case of S.H.C. v. Sheng-Yen Lu illustrates the above
point.1 4 In Sheng-Yen a Buddhist temple member who had
sexual intercourse with the grandmaster charged the temple
with negligently supervising the grandmaster."' The member
claimed the Temple officials knew of the behavior and did
nothing to remedy the situation.' In the Buddhist faith the
stanzas of Guru devotion state that followers "should 'see only
good qualities in [the grandmaster], and never any faults."'
Furthermore, if the grandmaster "'acts in [an]
unenlightened manner' the follower should remember that
'your own opinions are unreliable and the apparent
faults you
see may only be a reflection of your own deluded state of
mind."14 7 Finally, if one discovers that the Guru is a "phony and
without any achievement as Dharma, then one should depart
from the Guru and take refuge in another true Guru. With
regard to the original Guru, however, . . . one should not
criticize nor slander the former Guru."' Thus, for the court to
decide if the Temple leaders acted reasonably in supervising
the grandmaster it would necessarily have to interpret and
pass judgment on the sects' belief in not exposing the Guru as a
phony. The court would have to ask itself whether in light of
the sects' beliefs the Temple should have been other than
"obedient" to the guru. "Should the Temple have
seen faults in
or 'criticized' him? Should the Temple have 'slandered' him by
calling into question the activities of which it had
knowledge?" 14 Answering these questions would result in an
unavoidable entanglement of church and state.
This analysis is in line with the Supreme Court case law
discussed above on excessive entanglement. In cases such as
Hernandez and Jimmy Swaggart the Supreme Court has
implied that where a regulation necessitates inquiry into
church doctrines, excessive entanglement will occur.15 9 In
Jimmy Swaggart the Court emphasized that the reason the
imposition of the sales and use tax did not result in an
excessive entanglement with the state was because it did not
require inquiry "into the religious content of the items sold or
'

144 54

P.3d 174 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).

145 Id. at

175-76.

Id. at 177.
147 Id. at
179.
146

148

Id.

149 54

P.3d at 179.
'50See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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11
the religious motivation for selling or purchasing the items."
In contrast, in this case an extremely intensive examination
and interpretation of religious doctrine would be necessary to
decide the claim of negligent supervision and thus an excessive
152
entanglement between church and state would result. As said
above, it is not enough, as the Florida Supreme Court claims,
to base the decision entirely on a question of foreseeability; it is
also necessary to make a determination as to whether, given
the foreseeability of the harm, the defendants acted reasonably.
Some may argue that the intensive examination of
church doctrines described above is not necessary as a court
can simply create one over-arching employer standard of care
for all religions, avoiding any excessive entanglement of church
and state. However, it is not that simple. If a court failed to
engage in an intensive examination of church doctrine and
create a reasonable standard for each religion, and instead
created a single "employer standard of care" for all religions,
the action of the court may inadvertently result in an
endorsement of a particular religion and thus still violate the
Establishment Clause.153 Creating a single standard may
inadvertently result in such an endorsement because the court
risks favoring one model for church hiring, ordination, and
retention over another." For example, the court may find that
Jewish rabbis discipline deviant clerics much better than
Catholic priests, thus inadvertently endorsing the Jewish
model of discipline over the Catholic model. Such endorsement
is exactly what the Establishment Clause aims to prevent.
Therefore, since the claim of negligent supervision
would require the court to examine and interpret religious
doctrine or endorse one religion over another, the reasoning of
the Florida Supreme Court was wrong and the negligence
claims should have been dismissed under the Establishment
Clause.

151
152
'53

493 U.S. 378, 395-96 (1990).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); Scott C.

Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities,and the Decline of ConstitutionalProtection,
75 IND.L.J. 219, 231-32 (Winter 2000).
Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 247; Idleman, supra note 153.
5

20041

MALICKI V. DOE

1147

c. Inconsistency with the Religious Autonomy Doctrine
Still a third reason the Florida Supreme Court was
wrong in upholding the negligent supervision claim is that it
contradicts the religious autonomy doctrine.' 5' Under this doctrine, secular courts are not permitted to involve themselves in
disputes that would require the interpretation of religious
law.'56 In Serbian, the Court quotes Watson v. Jones for the
principle that:
[T]he rule of action which should govern the civil courts... is, that,
whenever the questions of discipline, or faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
must accept such decisions as final, and binding on them, in their
application to the case before them.'57

The Court's concern is if civil courts become too involved
in matters concerning "theological controversy, church
discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the
member of the church to the standard of morals required of
them . . ." the court will deprive these institutions of the
authority to run their own affairs." "Indeed, it is the essence of
religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are
to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or
measurable by objective criteria.' 5. In the end, the Court in
Serbian found it was improper for the Illinois Supreme Court
to pass judgment on the decision to remove a bishop from the
church."n In reaching its conclusion the Court noted that for the
Illinois Supreme Court to render its decision it had to engage
in a detailed review of the removal and defrockment
proceedings and determine whether they were in accordance

with church policy."'
Like in Serbian, for the court to decide the negligent
supervision claim in this case it would have to engage in
See discussion supra Part III.A.
Id.
157426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976).
" Id. at 714.
155

156

9 Id. at 714-15.
"6 Id. at 718.
161

Id. The Court stated "[n]ot only was this 'detailed review' impermissible

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but in reaching this conclusion, the court
evaluated conflicting testimony concerning internal church procedures and reflected
the interpretations of relevant procedural provisions of the Mother Church's highest
tribunals." Id.
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62
extensive interpretations of church doctrine.' Furthermore, it
would effectively override the discretion of the church to
engage in its own disciplinary and governance decisions and
impermissibly dictate how the church or its congregation could
act in the future.'" This is not permitted under the religious
autonomy doctrine and thus the Florida Supreme Court was
irresponsible in upholding the negligent supervision claim.
It is imperative to note that the application of the
religious autonomy doctrine to the case at had is not without
its problems. Thus far the religious autonomy doctrine has only
been applied in cases involving internal disputes within or
among various churches.'" In contrast, this case would involve
its application to a dispute between the church and an outside
third party. Nonetheless, the doctrine is important to consider
because it is conceivable that the Supreme Court would choose
to extend the doctrine to this set of facts because "[wihile it is
true that the pleading caption... identiflies] a dispute between
church officials and a third [ party, a closer inquiry reveals
that the nature of the dispute . . . implicates a secular
examination into 'intra-church' process and procedure; an
6 5
action proscribed by our Constitution.'

IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS AND SOLUTIONS

The shortcomings of Malicki aside, there are very
important social reasons for imposing liability upon the Roman
Catholic Church and other religious institutions for the blatant
disregard of the welfare of individuals put in the care of its
clergy. The remainder of this Comment will discuss these
policy concerns, namely, the impact of sexual abuse by clerics
on its victims and the failure of religious institutions to tackle
the problem themselves. This Comment will also pose possible
alternate remedial schemes, including the utilization of some
intentional torts and criminal charges.
The impact of clergy sexual abuse upon its victims, child
or adult, can be devastating and extremely long lasting.'"
Studies have equated the harm suffered by women sexually
162

See discussion supra part III.B.2.a.

'

Malicki, 814 So. 2d 347, 368 (Fla. 2002) (Harding, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 356.

'r

'

Id. at 368 (Harding, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Eduardo Cruz, Comment, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock: Clergy

Sexual Exploitationand Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. L. REV. 499, 507 (1991).
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abused by clerics with the extent and type of harm suffered by
incest victims.'6 7 The situations are similar since the women
liken the dominating role of the cleric with the dominating role
of their fathers.'" The harm manifests itself in "diminished selfesteem, increased feelings of personal ambivalence, increased
sexual difficulties, anger at being exploited, a feeling of being
used as a sex object,... an inability to trust other therapists"
and possible hospitalization and suicide.'9 The "God Factor"
further exacerbates these negative effects.'7 ° Since the victim in
these cases often associates the abuser with God, the violation
may spur a spiritual crisis, causing the victim to leave the
church and suffer the "loss of pastor, faith and the community
of faith." Furthermore, the victims often blame God for the
abuse.'' Without the comfort of her faith, the victim is arguably
worse off than she would have been if a secular individual had
sexually abused her. 2 If this were not enough, in many
instances involving abuse against women, the religious
community may shun a victim who exposes the abuse as a
seductress and someone who should be ashamed of herself.' 73
The impact on children of such abuse is more damaging
still. Studies have shown that abused girls and boys "display
problems in the areas of body image, impaired intimacy,
depression, manifestations of self-destruction and traumatic
rage. Boys often bear the extra burdens of confusion about
their gender identity'. and hyper-vigilance toward other
males.' 7' There have also been cases in which sexually abused
males have displayed compulsive, and sometimes even violent,
sexual contact with females.' For example, one sixteen-yearold boy, who had been "molested for two years by a priest
reported . . . [that] even in the midst of lovemaking, he [was]
haunted by his memory of the priest. He state[d], 'I'll see him
on top of me [and] smell his cologne and house.' Unable to
167

Id.

168

Id.
Id.
Id. at 508.

169
170

.. Cruz, supra note 166, at 508.
...John H. Arnold, Clergy Sexual Malpractice, 8 U. FLA. J. LAW. & PUB. POL'Y
25, 33 (1996).
173 Cruz, supra note
166, at 508.
174 Gender identity problems occurs in
males and not females because the
molesters are almost exclusively male. Arnold, supra note 172, at 33.
175 Id.
176

Id.
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maintain his erection, he displaces his anger onto the woman
for her sexual inadequacy."1 77 In conclusion, considering the
traumatic effects cleric sexual abuse has on its victims, it is
imperative to propose possible solutions to curb the epidemic.
The failure of religious institutions to confront and
remedy the problem themselves accentuates the need for
outside solutions. Instead of exploring ways to prevent abuse,
these institutions often act in a very protective manner,
7
shielding themselves from any possible outside criticism. ' The
institutions prevent criticism by ensuring that society never
hears of the episodes of abuse in the first place. Historically,
79
churches have had a "sexual ethic that stresses secrecy"' and a
practice of ignoring and covering up the stories of the victims
without charging the wrongdoer."a Even if the wrongdoing
priest or minister was charged by the church, conviction would
be problematic because "[in Canon Law, the penal process is
derailed if a pedophilic priest simply expresses sorrow and
seeks reconciliation.""' In recent years, the most common
remedy for sexually deviant behavior is for the institution
simply to recommend counseling and transfer the clergyman to
another parish.'
Therefore, due to the very harmful effects of clergy
sexual abuse on its victims, and the failure of religious
institutions to react and remedy the abuse, society must deal
177
171
179

Id.
Id. at 34.
Cruz, supra note 166, at 508. See Fox Butterfield, 789 Children Abused by

Priests Since 1940, Massachusetts Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2003, at Al (quoting

Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly) ("When they had a choice between
protecting children and protecting the church, they chose secrecy to protect the
church.... They sacrificed the children for many, many years.").
'80 Arnold, supra note 172, at 35.
In sixteenth-century England, when Reginald Scott wrote that the
widespread belief that sleeping women had been impregnated by demons
was, in fact, a cover for sexual crimes of the clergy, King James had his book
burned. In the contemporary church, sexual abuse has been handled as an
internal matter with both the clergy and laity 'agreeing' to hide the truth.
Id. For example, in the Louisville Kentucky Archdiocese, after a priest admitted to the
archbishop that he had molested a 15-year-old boy, the archbishop concluded that the
priest was not a danger and kept him in place. Jeffrey Gettleman, Church Settlement
Goes Beyond the Accused, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2003, at A22.
181 Arnold, supra note 172, at 35.
182 Id. See Daniel J. Wakin, Two Bishops in New York are Faulted in Abuse

Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2003, at B1 (reporting how one New York Bishop "[hiad a
clear preference for keeping abusers in ministry by quietly moving them to new
parishes instead of banishing them"). "The bishop also apparently felt that once
caught, a molester priest would not abuse again, . . . [and thus failed] 'to take any
meaningful steps to limit abusive priests' contact with children in the future." Id.
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with the dilemma in other ways. Some possible responses
include the utilization of intentional torts, vicarious liability,
and criminal charges.
A.

Intentional Torts

In the past, courts have utilized several intentional tort
theories to hold the church and other religious institutions
liable for the sexual abuse of its parishioners. These torts
include: (1) intentional failure to supervise the clergy and (2)
intentional infliction of emotional distress."
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized the tort of
intentional failure to supervise the clergy in Gibson v. Brewer."
The court refused to hear a negligent supervision claim on the
grounds that determining the reasonableness of a church's
supervision of a cleric requires exploring and interpreting
religious doctrine. 85 The court further reasoned that barring
the action was proper because otherwise it would "create an
excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the
endorsement of one model of supervision."'" However, the court
then proceeded to uphold the tort of intentional failure to
supervise the clergy."7 The court reasoned that the rule of
Employment Division, that the "right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability," applied both to
generally applicable criminal laws and intentional torts."' In
the court's opinion, the application to intentional torts was
'
See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 248-49 (Mo. 1997) (en banc);
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "intentional
torts of a cleric are already actionable, . . . even though [they involve] incidents of
religious practice and belief"); F.G. v. MacDonnell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997)
(noting that "courts have recognized claims for intentional torts against clergymen");
Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 785-86 (Okla. 1989).
184 952 S.W.2d at 248-49. Other
courts have also upheld the tort while at the
same time rejecting negligence claims. See, e.g., Heroux v. Carpentier, No. C.A. PC 925807, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 52, 26-27 (Sup. Ct. R.I. Jan. 23, 1998).
185 Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at
248-49.
186
187

Id.

188

Id. at 248.

Id. The court defined the tort by saying:
[a] cause of action for intentional failure to supervise clergy is stated if (1) a
supervisor (or supervisors) exists, (2) the supervisor (or supervisors) knew
that harm was certain or substantially certain to result, (3) the supervisor (or
supervisors) disregarded this known risk, (4) the supervisor's inaction caused
damage, and (5) the other requirements of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 317 are met.
Id.
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logical because "religious conduct intended or certain to cause
harm need not be tolerated under the First Amendment.""
Pleading under this tort theory would not implicate the
First Amendment because it does not involve the interpretation
or rejection of specific scriptural beliefs. In resolving this
intentional tort claim the Free Exercise Clause is not violated
because the court is not passing judgment on the
reasonableness of a given religion's doctrinally-imbued
supervision policy and thus it is not rejecting any religious
doctrine." Because there is no reasonableness inquiry to be
made, it also does not implicate the Establishment Clause. As
stated above, to make any reasonableness determinations one
must examine how a reasonably prudent person under the
same or similar circumstances would act, i.e., how a reasonable
bishop or a reasonable rabbi would act. 9 ' With an intentional
tort, there are no such examinations because it comes down to
one objective question: Did a supervisor disregard a known risk
resulting in injury?
This tort would prove successful in holding religious
institutions liable in numerous instances. In many of these
cases, parishioners bring molestation or sexual misconduct to
the attention of the religious leaders who nevertheless continue
to allow the clergyman to work closely with parishioners - even
92
'
small children - and engage in further sexual abuse.
Therefore the actions of these leaders would properly fit the
elements of the tort, as they will have disregarded (allowed
continued contact with parishioners) a known risk (sexual
abuse brought to their attention) resulting in further injury
(more sexual abuse).
The judiciary has also regarded the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED)Y3 as a second means of

19 Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 248.

'90 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.a
191 See discussion supra Part III.B.2.b.
192 See, e.g., Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 243. (finding that upon parents bringing to
the attention of the Diocese an incident in which a priest fondled their son, they were
told that "this happens to young men all the time' and that Michael 'would get over
it"); see also supra notes 180, 182 and accompanying text.
193 The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress include the
following: (1) that the actor intended to inflict or recklessly caused emotional distress;
(2) the conduct causing the distress was extreme or outrageous; (3) the defendant's
conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) the emotional distress
sustained by the plaintiff was severe. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1977).
The word intent means "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he
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holding religious institutions liable for the actions of clerics."
Again, the Gibson court upheld this claim on the ground that
"liability for intentional torts [could] be imposed without
excessively delving into religious doctrine, polity, or practice.""'
Similarly, the Court of Appeal of California in Nally v. Grace
Community Church of the Valley upheld a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress against a group of church
defendants.' In Nally, plaintiffs son, Kenneth Nally, was
receiving spiritual and personal counseling from a pastor of the
church.'97 The pastor discouraged Kenneth from seeking further
psychiatric or psychological counseling despite the pastor's
awareness of Kenneth's suicidal tendencies. 8 As a result,
Kenneth committed suicide.1" The plaintiff parents further
alleged that the defendants exacerbated Kenneth's preexisting
guilt, anxiety, and depression, and held out suicide as a viable
option." Based on these facts, the court upheld a judgment
against the church, stating that "while defendants' religious
beliefs are absolutely protected by the First Amendment, . . .
the [FIree [E]xercise [Cilause does not license intentional
infliction of emotional distress in the name of religion and
cannot shield defendants from liability for wrongful death for a
suicide caused by such conduct.""' This Comment supports this
reasoning and the application of IIED for the same reasons
expounded above, particularly, the fact that it requires no
inquiry into religious doctrine.

believes

that the

consequences

are substantially certain

to

result

from

it."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977).
'9
See, e.g., Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus College, 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 219 (D.
Conn. 2000); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 785-86 (Okla.
1989) (holding that where the Church defendant punished a parishioner for the sin of
fornication, the first amendment did not shield them from a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that lower court erred in dismissing intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim where parishioner was seduced by the pastor as the claim was not
barred by the First Amendment).
195952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo. 1997) (en
banc).
19 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 308-09
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
' Id. at 304.
198 Id.

199 Id.

200Id.

at 305. Evidence was introduced showing that when Kenneth
showed
the pastor an injury to his arm from an attempted suicide the pastor told him it was
"God's punishment." 204 Cal. Rptr. at 305. Furthermore, a tape by Pastor Thomson at
the church stated "suicide is one of the ways that the Lord takes home a disobedient
believer." Id at 306.
201

Id. at 308-09.
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However, IIED may prove a more problematic claim
failure to supervise clergy. Several courts
intentional
than
have already rejected the tort as violating the First
Amendment since determining whether conduct was extreme or
outrageous would require the interpretation of religious
doctrine."2 Furthermore, the tort imposes a very high standard
of proof on the plaintiff. IIED requires not only intentional
conduct, but also "extreme and outrageous" conduct intended to
cause "severe emotional harm" which manifests itself in "bodily
harm." °2 These standards are quite high and may be difficult to
prove in court. Even in Gibson, although the court upheld the
application of the tort, it found that the plaintiffs did not meet
their burden of proof because they could not prove that the
"Diocese's sole purpose in its conduct was to invade the
"
Gibsons' interest in freedom from emotional distress. '
Therefore, suits under IIED may be a last rather than a first
resort.
With either one of these intentional torts, the claim can
be made that they do nothing to compensate for the first, and
perhaps only, instance of sexual abuse. However, it is not the
first instance of abuse that any of these claims, including the
negligence claims, are aiming to prevent. The goal of the
litigation in this area is to hold churches accountable for
ignoring known or easily discoverable abuses. The intentional
tort claims would effectuate such a goal.
Criminal Charges

B.

Civil suits are not the only means of holding religious
institutions accountable for their failure to supervise their
members. Alternatively, the state can criminally prosecute the
superiors of these institutions.2 "' The major benefit of imposing
criminal rather than civil sanctions is that religious
institutions and their leaders cannot claim immunity under the
Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses. It has long been held
202

See, e.g., Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc., 738 A.2d 839,

848 (Me. 1999) (dismissing intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as it would
.require direct inquiry into the religious sanctions, discipline, and terms of redemption
or forgiveness that were available within the church . . ."); see also, Olson v. First
Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1977).
204 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
'0' It is unclear whether religious institutions themselves can be held liable
under criminal statutes or only its leaders. See discussion infra note 218.
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by the Supreme Court that the "free exercise of religion does
not include the right to commit crimes in the name of
religion."' For example, in Reynolds v. United States 7 and
Davis v. Beason, °8 the Supreme Court made clear that the
federal government had a right to criminalize polygamy and
arrest those persons who violated the law even if they claimed
to be engaging in such acts as an exercise of their religion.
Similarly, in Cox v. New Hampshire, the Court stated that it is
not a defense to ignoring a traffic light that it is part of your
religious duty to disobey municipal commands." In short, what
these cases stand for is the idea that religion is not immune
from the criminal law. Therefore, if in these sexual misconduct
cases religious leaders are charged with a generally applicable
criminal law, they will not be able to hide behind a defense of
immunity.
The specific crimes charged against a religious
institution and its leaders vary between jurisdictions. Even so,
a focus on the criminal laws of New York State will provide a
sense of the types of conduct that criminal sanctions can reach.
A number of criminal statutes in New York could apply to the
religious leaders in these sexual misconduct cases. The most
easily applicable of these laws is endangering the welfare of a
child. The child endangerment statute says that "[a] person is
guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when . . . [hie
knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the
physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen
years old . . . ." ' In many of these molestation cases the
religious superiors have placed children in the custody of clergy
knowing of past instances of molestation and sodomy."' Thus a
jury could find that these individuals knowingly placed
children in harm's way, violating the statute outlined above.
These institutional leaders may also fall under the
umbrella of criminal facilitation statutes. According to the New
York law,
[a] person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree when,
believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person who intends
Kramer, supra note 26. See also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding that religiously-neutral criminal laws would be upheld by the court).
206

207 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
208 133 U.S. 333, 341-43

(1890).

209 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
210
21

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (Consol. 2004).

Gettleman, supra note 180; Wakin, supra note 182.
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to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person
with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in
fact aids such person to commit a felony .... "'

This is obviously a more difficult statute to apply than the child
endangerment law because the crime involves more and
heightened elements.2 3 However, a jury could possibly find that
the religious leaders facilitated the crime by permitting a cleric
to have continued contact with parishioners despite evidence of
sexual misconduct."4 Furthermore, in cases where the
institutional leaders actually concealed the cleric's actions from
the public, facilitating the cleric's ability to commit the crime
again, the State should have an easier time showing that
religious superiors aided in the crime. The importance of
finding criminal facilitation statutes applicable in these sexual
misconduct cases is that they will cover misconduct against
adults as well as children.
Even if the two statutes above can be invoked against
religious leaders, there are still the problems of penalty and
applicability. Endangering the welfare of a child and criminal
facilitation are Class A Misdemeanors and thus are punishable
by no more than one year in jail 1' or a one thousand dollar
fine.2 6 Having such minor penalties may not result in the
desired level of accountability.2 7 Second, these laws only apply
2
to the individuals and not the institution directly. " Unless
2" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00 (Consol. 2004).
213 With child endangerment, all that needs to be proven is that the person
that their conduct could lead to injury to a minor. N.Y. PENAL LAW §
knowledge
had
260.10 (Consol. 2004). Conversely, with the facilitation statute, the plaintiff must
show: (1) the defendant believed he was aiding a person who intended to commit a
crime, (2) the defendant provided the opportunity for such commission, and (3) the
defendant in fact aided in the commission of a felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00
(Consol. 2004).
214 This finding would have to read as follows: Since the denominational
leaders knew of past sexually deviant behavior and knew the cleric received no
counseling for this behavior they were aware of the probability that the cleric intended
to commit a future crime, and in fact aided that person in the commission of that crime
by providing them with the opportunity to do so. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 115.00 (Consol.

2004).

211 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (Consol. 2004).

'16 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.05 (Consol. 2004).

2" However, if the state, instead of bringing a single charge, begins to stack
charges against the church the accountability incentives once again increase. Also,
media attention to the levying of criminal sanctions against religious leaders may
create embarrassment for the affiliated religious institution, in turn creating a greater
incentive to expose and remedy such activities in the future.

2" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.00 (Consol. 2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (Consol.
first element of crime is perpetrator must be a person). The penal law
(stating
2004)
defines a person as "a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private
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laws can hold the institution directly accountable, the internal
policies of the entity are not likely to change as quickly.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, based on the modem interpretations of
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, religious
institutions are virtually immune from negligent hiring and
supervision claims. A religious organization's hiring, firing, and
disciplinary policies are imbued with religious doctrine, beliefs,
and practices. Any attempt by a court to determine whether
such policies are reasonable would necessarily require the
examination and interpretation of the denomination's scripture
- an examination that is foreclosed by both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses. However, the impact of cleric
sexual abuse can be devastating on its victims and thus
religious organizations must not be permitted to escape all
responsibility for their willful blindness in these cases.
Therefore, it is important for society to find solutions to this
epidemic, such as those examined in this Comment.

Lisa J. Kelty'

corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a
governmental instrumentality." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (Consol. 2004). Therefore,
unless the religious organization is considered an unincorporated association the penal
law will not apply to it. This will vary based on the religious sect at issue.
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